BHUBANESWAR: The bird flu virus has struck Bhubaneswar, spreading panic among dealers and consumers of poultry products here. The High Security Animal Disease Laboratory ( HSADL) of Indian Veterinary Research Institute ( IVRI) in Bhopal confirmed detection of the dreaded disease on Friday after testing samples sent by the Central Poultry Development Organisation (CPDO) here. 

CDPO's farm is located behind the Kalinga Stadium in Nayapalli area in the heart of the city. "We have declared an area spread over three-km radius off the epicentre (the farm) as alert zone and ordered ban on movement of poultry birds or related products into the area or outside," commissioner, Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation, Vishal Dev, told TOI. 

BMC convened a meeting to discuss the issue and decided to forthwith initiate all preventive and precautionary measures. Official sources said CPDO had sent three samples for testing to the Bhopal laboratory after some birds died in its farm in the last week of January. 

"Of the three samples, at least one has tested positive for the H5N1 virus which causes bird flu or avian influenza," an officer disclosed. 

Detection of bird flu in Bhubaneswar comes on the heels of the government undertaking culling operations at Keranga in Khurda district and Bahanada in Betanoti block of Mayurbhanj district to prevent the spread of the virus. 

Official sources said culling was expected in the CPDO farm and adjacent areas, but orders were awaited from the Centre.

# 6118

Over the past few months we’ve been witness to a fascinating, volatile, and sometimes unseemly debate over controversial `dual use’ H5N1 research.  I’ve tried to present both sides of this issue as fairly as possible, without interjecting my own opinion.

Not because I don’t hold an opinion on this topic (I most certainly do), but because I believe that these issues are far too important this non-scientist to marginalize either side by taking pot shots at them in this blog. 

I certainly understand (and share) the deep feelings that many scientists hold regarding the sanctity of independent and unfettered scientific research, and their abhorrence of anything that smacks of government censorship.

And from a practical standpoint, given the backchannel communications in the scientific community, I have considerable doubts as to whether this H5N1 genie can now be coaxed back into its bottle. 

But I also know from my years working as a paramedic –where patient safety and the principle of Primum non nocere ("First, do no harm") reign supreme - why the NSABB would have been hard pressed to come up with any recommendation other than the one they did.

And it boils down to the Precautionary Principle, which is a basic tenant of public policy which says:

When the health of humans and the environment is at stake, you need not wait for scientific certainty of risk before taking protective action.

So basic and widespread is this ideal that its use has become a statutory requirement in many countries.

In 1998, the Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle summarized the policy as:

When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.

Essentially, if an action, or a byproduct of some action can reasonably perceived as being potentially harmful to the environment or to public health, the onus of proof of its safety falls to the activity’s proponent.

The NSABB’s role, as defined in their FAQ, is to

` . . . provide advice, guidance, and leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research to all Federal departments and agencies with an interest in life sciences research.

 

The NSABB advises on and recommends specific strategies for the efficient and effective oversight of federally conducted or supported dual use biological research, taking into consideration national security concerns and the needs of the research community.’

In other words, it was their job to look at these research projects, and if they found a reasonable concern for public safety, to raise a red flag.

Which is precisely what they did. 

The dismissive arguments over the true CFR of the H5N1 virus, or whether transmissibility in ferrets necessarily translates transmissibility in humans, completely misses the point.

 

Whether you agree or disagree with the committee’s conclusions, the NSABB simply did what they were designed to do as part of a system of checks and balances.

While there is no scientific certainty that any harm would come from the publication of these papers, it can be reasonably argued that - in the wrong hands - this information could potentially lead to a serious, even catastrophic mishap.

And under the Precautionary Principal, the NSABB had little choice but to raise their concerns, with the onus then falling on those wishing to proceed to prove the safety of doing so.

Although there has been a lot of outrage and posturing on both sides of this issue - it seems clear to me that however flawed - the system has worked this time.

The NSABB committee raised their concerns, and in doing so, has forced a conversation that’s been too long overdue.

 

 

How are we to handle this brave new world of life sciences, where new viruses and other life forms can be created in the laboratory?

 

Who decides what is appropriate, or safe research? Or what should be published, and who should have access to redacted information?

 

What laboratory protocols and protections are necessary for working the the H5N1 virus?

 

And under the WHO’s PIP (Pandemic Influenza Preparedness) Framework, adopted last May by the 64th World Health Assembly, who is entitled to receive samples of these new strains of the virus?

Over the past few weeks I’ve been saddened to see some of the world’s best scientists and researchers maligned by the media as crazed present day Dr. Frankensteins – ready to unleash a killer plague that would wipe out half of humanity for the sake of getting another research grant.

While those urging caution - recommending a review of research protocols and possible redaction of these papers - have been characterized as being tools of an oppressive and paranoid biosecurity industry.

When the simple truth is, both sides are simply doing the job we rightfully expect of them. They may have different mandates, and priorities, but both are valid and important.

 

If we manage to keep ahead of the H5N1 virus, it will be due in large part to the kind of groundbreaking work being done in the labs of Ron Fouchier, Yoshiro Kawaoka, and others. 

But these research projects are not without some risk, and that is why some oversight is necessary.

While the NSABB won’t be the final arbiter of this case (this needs to have an International solution), the only reason we are now having this conversation today is because they took a difficult and unpopular stance.

The hard work lies ahead; forging some sort of workable compromise that will protect important scientific research, and at the same time shield the public from unnecessary and avoidable risks. 

I don’t pretend to have the answers.  And I fully expect that there is no `perfect’ solution to be had.

But I do know that the first step towards reaching any meaningful compromise is for all sides involved to accept as valid the concerns held by the other stakeholders in this debate, instead of simply trying to dismiss them as unfounded or overblown. 

And discouragingly, so far I’ve seen precious little of that in the debate so far.

BHUBANESWAR: The bird flu virus has struck Bhubaneswar, spreading panic among dealers and consumers of poultry products here. The High Security Animal Disease Laboratory ( HSADL) of Indian Veterinary Research Institute ( IVRI) in Bhopal confirmed detection of the dreaded disease on Friday after testing samples sent by the Central Poultry Development Organisation (CPDO) here. 

CDPO's farm is located behind the Kalinga Stadium in Nayapalli area in the heart of the city. "We have declared an area spread over three-km radius off the epicentre (the farm) as alert zone and ordered ban on movement of poultry birds or related products into the area or outside," commissioner, Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation, Vishal Dev, told TOI. 

BMC convened a meeting to discuss the issue and decided to forthwith initiate all preventive and precautionary measures. Official sources said CPDO had sent three samples for testing to the Bhopal laboratory after some birds died in its farm in the last week of January. 

"Of the three samples, at least one has tested positive for the H5N1 virus which causes bird flu or avian influenza," an officer disclosed. 

Detection of bird flu in Bhubaneswar comes on the heels of the government undertaking culling operations at Keranga in Khurda district and Bahanada in Betanoti block of Mayurbhanj district to prevent the spread of the virus. 

Official sources said culling was expected in the CPDO farm and adjacent areas, but orders were awaited from the Centre.

# 6118

Over the past few months we’ve been witness to a fascinating, volatile, and sometimes unseemly debate over controversial `dual use’ H5N1 research.  I’ve tried to present both sides of this issue as fairly as possible, without interjecting my own opinion.

Not because I don’t hold an opinion on this topic (I most certainly do), but because I believe that these issues are far too important this non-scientist to marginalize either side by taking pot shots at them in this blog. 

I certainly understand (and share) the deep feelings that many scientists hold regarding the sanctity of independent and unfettered scientific research, and their abhorrence of anything that smacks of government censorship.

And from a practical standpoint, given the backchannel communications in the scientific community, I have considerable doubts as to whether this H5N1 genie can now be coaxed back into its bottle. 

But I also know from my years working as a paramedic –where patient safety and the principle of Primum non nocere ("First, do no harm") reign supreme - why the NSABB would have been hard pressed to come up with any recommendation other than the one they did.

And it boils down to the Precautionary Principle, which is a basic tenant of public policy which says:

When the health of humans and the environment is at stake, you need not wait for scientific certainty of risk before taking protective action.

So basic and widespread is this ideal that its use has become a statutory requirement in many countries.

In 1998, the Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle summarized the policy as:

When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.

Essentially, if an action, or a byproduct of some action can reasonably perceived as being potentially harmful to the environment or to public health, the onus of proof of its safety falls to the activity’s proponent.

The NSABB’s role, as defined in their FAQ, is to

` . . . provide advice, guidance, and leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research to all Federal departments and agencies with an interest in life sciences research.

 

The NSABB advises on and recommends specific strategies for the efficient and effective oversight of federally conducted or supported dual use biological research, taking into consideration national security concerns and the needs of the research community.’

In other words, it was their job to look at these research projects, and if they found a reasonable concern for public safety, to raise a red flag.

Which is precisely what they did. 

The dismissive arguments over the true CFR of the H5N1 virus, or whether transmissibility in ferrets necessarily translates transmissibility in humans, completely misses the point.

 

Whether you agree or disagree with the committee’s conclusions, the NSABB simply did what they were designed to do as part of a system of checks and balances.

While there is no scientific certainty that any harm would come from the publication of these papers, it can be reasonably argued that - in the wrong hands - this information could potentially lead to a serious, even catastrophic mishap.

And under the Precautionary Principal, the NSABB had little choice but to raise their concerns, with the onus then falling on those wishing to proceed to prove the safety of doing so.

Although there has been a lot of outrage and posturing on both sides of this issue - it seems clear to me that however flawed - the system has worked this time.

The NSABB committee raised their concerns, and in doing so, has forced a conversation that’s been too long overdue.

 

 

How are we to handle this brave new world of life sciences, where new viruses and other life forms can be created in the laboratory?

 

Who decides what is appropriate, or safe research? Or what should be published, and who should have access to redacted information?

 

What laboratory protocols and protections are necessary for working the the H5N1 virus?

 

And under the WHO’s PIP (Pandemic Influenza Preparedness) Framework, adopted last May by the 64th World Health Assembly, who is entitled to receive samples of these new strains of the virus?

Over the past few weeks I’ve been saddened to see some of the world’s best scientists and researchers maligned by the media as crazed present day Dr. Frankensteins – ready to unleash a killer plague that would wipe out half of humanity for the sake of getting another research grant.

While those urging caution - recommending a review of research protocols and possible redaction of these papers - have been characterized as being tools of an oppressive and paranoid biosecurity industry.

When the simple truth is, both sides are simply doing the job we rightfully expect of them. They may have different mandates, and priorities, but both are valid and important.

 

If we manage to keep ahead of the H5N1 virus, it will be due in large part to the kind of groundbreaking work being done in the labs of Ron Fouchier, Yoshiro Kawaoka, and others. 

But these research projects are not without some risk, and that is why some oversight is necessary.

While the NSABB won’t be the final arbiter of this case (this needs to have an International solution), the only reason we are now having this conversation today is because they took a difficult and unpopular stance.

The hard work lies ahead; forging some sort of workable compromise that will protect important scientific research, and at the same time shield the public from unnecessary and avoidable risks. 

I don’t pretend to have the answers.  And I fully expect that there is no `perfect’ solution to be had.

But I do know that the first step towards reaching any meaningful compromise is for all sides involved to accept as valid the concerns held by the other stakeholders in this debate, instead of simply trying to dismiss them as unfounded or overblown. 

And discouragingly, so far I’ve seen precious little of that in the debate so far.

Viruses very often spark controversies, but often the controversy is between the scientists who study them and groups of people beyond the academy. Think of HIV denialism, of the non-existent link between vaccines and autism, of the purported connection between the XMRV virus and chronic fatigue syndrome. 

The new bird flu controversy is different. It’s split the scientific community wide open. I’ve written about this controversy in recent weeks over at Slate, as well as here at the Loom. Like most reporters covering the story, I’ve sampled the sharply opposing viewpoints of scientists over the phone or via emails. 

But on Thursday night, we got to see this debate in person. The New York Academy of Sciences brought together a group of experts to talk about new virus, and whether self-censorship is a prudent protection or a dangerous precedent. I wasn’t sure what to expect; I was a bit worried it might have turned out to be a fairly dry discussion of how to inspect the hood equipment in virus labs. 

Instead, we witnessed explosive confrontation between scientists who think we may be facing a world-destroying catastrophe, and others who think our fear of non-existent threats is going to destroy science’s power to help us out of clear and present dangers.

Mike Coston at Avian Flu Diary also has a good post on the debate.

Update: The Guardian also has coverage of the debate.

# 6117

For those of you who may have missed the fireworks at last night’s New York Academy of Science (NYAS) panel discussion on the benefits and dangers of H5N1 research we’ve a few ways this morning for you to catch up.

The discussion – called  Dual Use Research: H5N1 Influenza Virus and Beyond – was moderated by famed epidemiologist and virus hunter Professor Ian Lipkin, who among his many accomplishments is Director, Center for Infection & Immunity, and John Snow Professor of Epidemiology at Columbia.

The panel members consisted of:

• Arturo Casadevall, MD, PhD, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, and member, NSABB;
• Laurie Garrett, PhD, Council on Foreign Relations;
• Barbara R. Jasny, PhD, Science;
• Veronique Kiermer, PhD, Nature Publishing Group;
• Michael T. Osterholm, PhD, MPH, Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota, and member, NSABB;
• Peter Palese, PhD, Mount Sinai School of Medicine;
• Vincent Racaniello, PhD, Columbia University;
• Alan S. Ruldolph, PhD, Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Anyone suspecting that this would be a dull affair – a stately debate bereft of fire or emotion – would have found their illusions bashed early on.

First stop, science writer Carl Zimmer provides a lengthy recap this morning in his Discover Magazine blog The Loom.

Flu Fighters

February 3rd, 2012 2:26 AM by Carl Zimmer

From the Sydney Morning Herald, we get this account.

Bird flu mutation sparks fears of deadly pandemic

Nick Miller, New York

February 4, 2012

And you can go back and watch the live tweeting of this event on Twitter by searching for the hashtag #NYAS. 

Things will get even more explosive later this month when this debate moves to a small, closed door meeting in Geneva to be hosted by the World Health Organization.

This debate has deeply polarized the scientific, and flu community. Both sides are claiming the moral high ground, and both are able to make good arguments to support their position.

 

After hearing both sides of this argument for months, I’ve come to the conclusion that anyone who believes there to be an obvious, easy, or guaranteed to be correct solution to to this scientific dilemma, hasn’t fully considered all sides of the issue.

Influenza A H5N1 is a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus that emerged as a human pathogen in 1997 when it was transmitted from avian populations to humans in Hong Kong. Since then, various countries around the world have reported human infections, particularly in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. From 2003 to 2011, 574 human cases and 337 deaths have been confirmed by the World Health Organization; this correlates to a mortality rate of 59%. H5N1 can cause death in healthy individuals with no pre-existing medical conditions. 

In November 2011, three independent studies on H5N1 transmission in ferrets were either published online or submitted for publication. These studies have received a significant amount of attention due to their relative success in producing engineered H5N1 viruses capable of efficient transmission in ferrets, including via the air. Ferrets are considered a good model for studying human influenza viruses. The engineered transmissible H5N1 viruses are not currently in circulation, but it is widely agreed that if released, the clinical and economic impact could be devastating.

The advisory goes on to specify CL4 as minimum containment levels for any experiments involving efficient H2H transmission of H5N1.

The Brazilian government is to give aid to two states in the north-west that have seen a recent increase in the number of Haitian migrants. This week, the ministry for social development announced it was to give around US$520,000 to the states of Acre and Amazonas. The first tranche of funds is expected to become available over the next month. 

The continued hardship in Haiti after the devastating earthquake in January 2010 has forced thousands of people to flee to other Latin American countries in search of a better life. 

The bulk of the money – around $300,000 – will support programmes in Amazonas, which has recorded more than 4,600 Haitians in the state. 

Acre has around 1,400 migrants. The government had already granted the state $750,000 to support its overloaded health service. 

The new money will be used to implement a series of programmes through local government bodies. These will provide food and accommodation to Haitians, as well as access to a special health service that will work independently from the national system, to meet the specific needs of the migrants. Some Haitians arrive in Brazil suffering from diseases such as cholera. Brazil's health ministry is anxious to ensure these don't spread to the local population. 

Other programmes will tackle education and skills. Portuguese language classes will be offered to immigrants who wish to work.

This is an act of remarkable political decency. It's also smart public-health policy. It ought to shame the US, which routinely turns back Haitians willing to risk their lives in search of work and safety.

Influenza A H5N1 is a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus that emerged as a human pathogen in 1997 when it was transmitted from avian populations to humans in Hong Kong. Since then, various countries around the world have reported human infections, particularly in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. From 2003 to 2011, 574 human cases and 337 deaths have been confirmed by the World Health Organization; this correlates to a mortality rate of 59%. H5N1 can cause death in healthy individuals with no pre-existing medical conditions. 

In November 2011, three independent studies on H5N1 transmission in ferrets were either published online or submitted for publication. These studies have received a significant amount of attention due to their relative success in producing engineered H5N1 viruses capable of efficient transmission in ferrets, including via the air. Ferrets are considered a good model for studying human influenza viruses. The engineered transmissible H5N1 viruses are not currently in circulation, but it is widely agreed that if released, the clinical and economic impact could be devastating.

The advisory goes on to specify CL4 as minimum containment levels for any experiments involving efficient H2H transmission of H5N1.

The Brazilian government is to give aid to two states in the north-west that have seen a recent increase in the number of Haitian migrants. This week, the ministry for social development announced it was to give around US$520,000 to the states of Acre and Amazonas. The first tranche of funds is expected to become available over the next month. 

The continued hardship in Haiti after the devastating earthquake in January 2010 has forced thousands of people to flee to other Latin American countries in search of a better life. 

The bulk of the money – around $300,000 – will support programmes in Amazonas, which has recorded more than 4,600 Haitians in the state. 

Acre has around 1,400 migrants. The government had already granted the state $750,000 to support its overloaded health service. 

The new money will be used to implement a series of programmes through local government bodies. These will provide food and accommodation to Haitians, as well as access to a special health service that will work independently from the national system, to meet the specific needs of the migrants. Some Haitians arrive in Brazil suffering from diseases such as cholera. Brazil's health ministry is anxious to ensure these don't spread to the local population. 

Other programmes will tackle education and skills. Portuguese language classes will be offered to immigrants who wish to work.

This is an act of remarkable political decency. It's also smart public-health policy. It ought to shame the US, which routinely turns back Haitians willing to risk their lives in search of work and safety.