Influenza Virus Mashup

Via People's Daily Online, a Xinhua report: Bangladesh destroys 140,000 birds, eggs after flu virus detection since November. Excerpt:

Bangladesh's authorities destroyed nearly 140,000 birds and eggs until last month since mid November when this season's first outbreak of bird flu was detected, an official said Wednesday. 

Ataur Rahman, assistant director at the control room of Bangladesh's Fisheries and Live Stock Department, told Xinhua that "Some 67,327 birds, including 12,714 at the latest on Tuesday, were culled in about a dozen flu-hit farms since the middle of November last year." 

During the same period, he said, "A total of 69,390 eggs were also destroyed." 

An official had earlier said risky factors of bird flu disease usually rise with the fall in temperature during January and February in Bangladesh which is considered a high-risk country with respect to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) as the South Asian nation of over 160 million people is especially vulnerable to virus perpetuation because of insufficient biosecurity, rearing of chickens and ducks together, selling of live birds, and deficient disease surveillance.

(Wed, 01 Feb 2012 12:10:00 +0000)

# 6112

Despite few reports of infected wild birds from mainland China (no doubt due to less than robust surveillance and reporting), most years we hear of a dozen or more H5N1 infected migratory birds making it into Hong Kong.

With each announcement, calls go out to increase biosecurity measures at local poultry farms, and for citizens to avoid contact with sick or dead birds.

In December of 2008 Hong Kong saw their first outbreak of H5N1 in domesticated poultry in nearly 6 years. In early 2009 it was announced that the H5N1 outbreak was `likely’ caused by infected migratory birds.  See Wild Birds Eyed As Likely Source Of Hong Kong Bird Flu Outbreak.

Since them, local authorities have become even more diligent in their surveillance and testing of dead birds.

Today, the Hong Kong government has announced the discovery of two more birds, from two different locations in the city, that have tested positive for the H5 virus in preliminary testing. 

Peregrine falcon and black-headed gull test positive for H5 virus

February 1, 2012 Issued at HKT 18:47

Preliminary testing of a dead peregrine falcon in Tung Chung and a dead black-headed gull in Yuen Long have tested positive for the H5 avian influenza virus, a spokesman for the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD) said today (February 1), adding that further confirmatory tests are being conducted.

 

On January 30, the dead peregrine falcon and black-headed gull were found and collected in the park of Seaview Crescent, Man Tung Road, Tung Chung and Chun Yin Square Playground, Yuen Long respectively.

 

Peregrine falcons are rare winter visitors to Hong Kong, while the black-headed gull is a common visitor.

 

The spokesman said there were no poultry farms within three kilometres of where the dead peregrine falcon was found, but four chicken farms are within three kilometres of where the dead black-headed gull was found.  AFCD staff inspected the farms and found no abnormal mortality or symptoms of avian influenza among the chicken flocks. These farms will be put under enhanced surveillance.

 

In view of these cases, the AFCD has phoned poultry farmers to remind them to strengthen precautionary and biosecurity measures against avian influenza. Letters have been sent to farmers, pet bird shop owners and licence holders of pet poultry and racing pigeons reminding them that proper precautions must be taken.

 

The spokesman said the department would conduct frequent inspections of poultry farms and the wholesale market to ensure that proper precautions against avian influenza have been implemented. The department will continue its wild bird monitoring and surveillance.

 

"People should avoid personal contact with wild birds and live poultry and their droppings. They should clean their hands thoroughly after coming into contact with them. The public can call 1823 for follow-up if they come across suspicious sick or dead birds, including the carcasses of wild birds and poultry," the spokesman said.

 

(Continue . . . )

China ranks 174th in Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index 2011/2012 (out of 179), while Hong Kong places 54th (not far below the United States which ranks 47th).

Which may help explain (in part, anyway) why most years we hear of more H5N1 infected birds from within the 426 sq. miles of Hong Kong than we do for the entire 3,704,426 sq. miles of mainland China.

(Tue, 31 Jan 2012 16:32:00 +0000)

# 6112

About an hour ago a 3-page PDF statement from the NSABB appeared on Science/ AAAS.org’s Public Health, Biosecurity, and H5N1 Forum, providing that committee’s rationale for requesting the redaction from science journals of key portions of recent controversial `dual use’  H5N1 research.

30 JANUARY 2012 | POLICY FORUM

Adaptations of Avian Flu Virus Are a Cause for Concern

K. I. Berns et al.

Members of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity explain its recommendations on the communication of experimental work on H5N1 influenza.

• Full Text (PDF)
• Comments

Meanwhile, mBio has published four views on all of this from Paul S. Keim, Vincent R. Racaniello, Robert G. Webster, and Arturo Casadevall & Thomas Shenk.

I’m headed there now to read:

 

Mammalian-Transmissible H5N1 Influenza: the Dilemma of Dual-Use Research

Robert G. Webster doi:10.1128/mBio.00005-12

 

Science Should Be in the Public Domain

Vincent R. Racaniello  doi:10.1128/mBio.00004-12

 

The NSABB Recommendations: Rationale, Impact, and Implications

 

Paul S. Keim  doi:10.1128/mBio.00021-12

 

The H5N1 Manuscript Redaction Controversy

Arturo Casadevall and Thomas Shenk doi:10.1128/mBio.00022-12

And on Thursday night, many of the major players in the world of influenza virology and biosecurity will convene for a 2 hour panel discussion, to be webcast by the New York Academy of Sciences (this appears to be a Pay-per-view event for non-members).

Here is the Press Release from the New York Academy of Sciences

Dual use research: H5N1 influenza virus and beyond

Experts to discuss controversial studies on avian flu virus at live event

WHAT: Dual Use Research: H5N1 Influenza Virus and Beyond

WHEN: Feb. 2, 6pm to 8pm

WHERE: The New York Academy of Sciences

REGISTER: www.nyas.org/H5N1

The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recently recommended that journals Nature and Science remove certain methodological details from controversial studies on the avian influenza virus (H5N1) to minimize the risk of these findings being misused by would-be bioterrorists. On February 2 from 6pm to 8pm, the Emerging Infectious Diseases & Microbiology Discussion Group of the New York Academy of Sciences presents Dual Use Research: H5N1 Influenza Virus and Beyond, a discussion between scientists, publishers, and legal experts that will explore the myriad issues surrounding the impending publication of these two studies and measures that will need to be undertaken to ensure the security of future such research.

 

To weigh in on matters of censorship and public safety, W. Ian Lipkin, MD, Center for Infection & Immunity at Columbia University, will moderate a panel discussion with Arturo Casadevall, MD, PhD, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, and member, NSABB; Laurie Garrett, PhD, Council on Foreign Relations; Barbara R. Jasny, PhD, Science; Veronique Kiermer, PhD, Nature Publishing Group; Michael T. Osterholm, PhD, MPH, Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota, and member, NSABB; Peter Palese, PhD, Mount Sinai School of Medicine; Vincent Racaniello, PhD, Columbia University; and Alan S. Ruldolph, PhD, Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

###

Attendees must register at www.nyas.org/H5N1. Media must RSVP to Diana Friedman, dfriedman@nyas.org.

The Washington Post takes note of the debate: Recommendation to censor bird flu research driven by fears of terrorism. Excerpt and then a comment:

Citing fears of an “unimaginable catastrophe,” a government-appointed board on Tuesday explained why it recently recommended censoring details of new research on deadly H5N1, or avian, influenza. 

“Our concern is that publishing these experiments in detail would provide information to some person, organization, or government that would help them to develop similar … viruses for harmful purposes,” the 23 voting members of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity wrote in a statement published jointly by the journals Science and Nature. 

The potential harm of publishing the work in full exceeded the potential benefits, the board wrote, adding its decision was unanimous.

 “We do not believe that widespread dissemination of the methodology in this case is a responsible action,” they wrote. 

The board compared the new research on H5N1 to the development of the atomic bomb in the 1940s. In that decade, physicists also confronted the dilemma of how much of their work to make public.

The argument by analogy with the A-bomb is a shaky one. Having recruited top physicists into the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer accepted the top-secret regime on them imposed by General Leslie Groves. But he worried that the silence in the physics journals would give the game away.

So the ferret is already out of the bag. Just as the atomic bomb was discussed well before World War II even broke out, the mutation of H5N1 has been so widely debated that anyone interested in using Fouchier and Kawaoka to weaponize H5N1 is doubtless already working hard but discreetly. (And dementedly.) 

Such researchers would also have to develop and test and distribute an effective vaccine before they dared to launch a weaponized H5N1, and that procedure would draw a great deal of attention…some of it from those fine young men in the US Navy Seals. 

(Tue, 31 Jan 2012 13:07:00 +0000)

Photo Credit – FAO

# 6111

Virologist Chairul Anwar Nidom of the Institute of Tropical Disease, Airlangga University probably knows more about how the H5N1 virus is evolving in Indonesia than anyone else.

Regular readers of this blog have come across his name dozens of times over the past few years, including here, here, and here. 

 

Dr. Nidom demonstrated in 2006 that 20% of feral cats he tested in Jakarta carried antibodies to the H5N1 virus (see here), and his team has detected the bird flu virus in pigs as well (see When Pigs Flu).

 

 

Today we’ve a long article by Dr. Nidom appearing in the Indonesian newspaper Kompas on the fight against bird flu, and some of the obstacles that lie ahead.

The bad news here is that his remarks are in the Indonesian language (Bahasan), and we must content ourselves with machine translations which can sometimes lose a bit in the process.

Despite this impediment, we can glean a good deal from Dr. Nidom’s article. A hat tip to Diane Morin and Sharon Sanders of FluTrackers for this find.

I’ve links to two different translations below - which I encourage you to read - followed by a bullet list of some of his main points.

As you’ll see, the finished product varies somewhat between the Google Translation and the Microsoft translation. It really takes reading both of them to get the most out of this story.

Via Microsoft’s Bing Translator:

The Fight Against Bird Flu 

and from Google’s Translator:

Warring Against Bird Flu

Among the points raised by Dr. Nidom:.

• Of the 33 provinces in Indonesia, 32 are endemic areas of bird flu in poultry and other animals.

• Control measures have not made visible progress over the past eight years.

• The National Commission on Bird Flu was disbanded last year, and they still await the Disease Control National Zoonoses program which they hope will have more impact.

• Unlike most cases in the past, officials have been unable to establish a link to infected poultry in the recent human cases in Bali, Jakarta and Tangerang.

• Dr. Nidom asks for a fatwa, or religious regulation so victims of bird flu or other contagious diseases can be autopsied (rarely done now due to cultural, societal, and religious reasons).

• He goes on to say that hospitals need to be trained to recognize and treat the H5N1 virus, and that it is likely that many cases go undiagnosed. He likens the number of cases we see to the `tip of the iceberg’.

• He calls for vaccination (when available) for people at the highest risk – particularly those living in the `triangle of bird flu, namely Jakarta, West Java, and Jakarta’, and suggests that Oseltamivir be made available over the counter.

• Dr. Nidom warns that the co-circulation of influenza viruses (H1N1, H3N2, H5N1)  in Indonesia may lead to a reassortment, producing new – potentially dangerous – strains.

• At one point Dr. Nidom states (ToggleText  Translation): In 2006, was carried out by the "artificial" mutation in the virus H5N1 from the poultry in Indonesia without the coalition. Evidently the virus H5N1 the poultry that formed a coalition with H3N2 more virulent (see PNAS: H3N2 And H5N1 Reassortment).

• One of the concerns expressed by Dr. Nidom in the past  is that vaccines – as they lose their effectiveness – could mask the symptoms of bird flu in poultry, but still allow the virus to spread. (see Bird Flu: Confusing Reports Out Of Indonesia).  He reports today: Healthy chickens positive for bird flu are located in Riau, Central Java, East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan and South Kalimantan.

• Dr. Nidom warns that a (shift/drift/coalition) of the virus could result in human-to-human transmission of the virus and concludes by saying: It is very important for Indonesia to confront the pandemic, given our region an ideal place of the coalition. All strains are available, while structuring the environment of animals and humans remains unclear.

While these are most of the highlights, there is more to glean from this article, and should we see a better translation I’ll certainly post the link.

In the meantime, there is much to consider here.

Science has published Adaptations of Avian Flu Virus Are a Cause for Concern. It's a PDF. Excerpt:

Dr. Vincent Racaniello is already tweeting some responses. It's going to be a lively day. 

Via ABC Rural: Japan suspends imports of Australian poultry products. Excerpt:

Japan has suspended imports of all Australian chicken meat and eggs after avian influenza was reported on a farm in Victoria. 

Up to 25,000 ducks have been destroyed on two farms north of Melbourne after the low pathogenic form of the disease was found last Friday, January 27th. 

Now the Japanese Government has responded by not allowing any Australian poultry products, including meat and eggs, nor egg derived products, like cake and ice-cream. 

The move is despite efforts by Australian authorities to reassure consumers all poultry products, even from affected farms, are safe to eat and "the risk to human health is negligible." 

Australia's Department of Agriculture's Biosecurity division says "Australian exporters of locally processed foods containing small amounts of egg products should first contact their buyer and confirm import conditions for Japan prior to export." 

In a statement this afternoon DAFF Biosecurity says it "will continue to work closely with Australian industries and relevant trading partners to ensure there is minimal disruption to trade."

(Mon, 30 Jan 2012 19:46:00 +0000)

BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID

# 6110

We are now 10 days into the self-imposed 60 day moratorium on the conducting (and publication) of controversial H5N1 research, and the meeting to discuss the future direction of such work in Geneva is still more than a couple of weeks away.

Meanwhile, the war of words - and the battle for the hearts and minds of the public - continues full throttle with advocates on both sides of this issue making their case in the media.

Today PBS Newshour has posted responses from three experts to a series of questions about this debate.

Richard H. Ebright - a molecular biologist at Rutgers

Vincent Racaniello - a microbiologist at Columbia, and author of the Virology Blog

Carl Zimmer, a journalist, author, and blogger

As you might imagine, there is a considerable difference of opinion over what should be done. Follow the link below to read:

SCIENCE — January 30, 2012 at 11:54 AM EDT

Experts Weigh in on Bird Flu Research

By: David Pelcyger

For earlier coverage of this story, you may wish to revisit:

Nature: Yoshihiro Kawaoka Talks About His H5N1 Research

WHO: Will Host H5N1 Talks In Geneva

ScienceMag: Ron Fouchier Interview On The H5N1 Research Moratorium

Science Magazine: Public Health, Biosecurity, and H5N1

There’s an old saying that Academic infighting is so vicious, because the stakes are so low. But in this case, both sides view the stakes here as being enormously high.

Biosecurity and concerns over public safety versus revered and well established principles of Scientific Freedom.

Given the tenor of some of the discussions I’ve seen over the past couple of weeks, the gulf between these two sides doesn’t seem to be getting any narrower.

(Mon, 30 Jan 2012 13:57:00 +0000)

# 6109

FEMA and Ready.gov, along with organizations like the American Red Cross (and indeed, this blog), spend a great deal of time trying to convince individuals, families, businesses and communities to prepare for emergencies and disasters.

The standardized advice is that everyone needs to be prepared to deal with a disaster for at least 3 days (meaning having a first aid kit, emergency supplies, and a plan) before help arrives.

Sure . . .  they’d like you to be prepared for longer . . .  but few enough Americans can be bothered to prepare for even 72 hours.

 

I personally advocate a minimum of a week’s worth of supplies (two would be better), but then I live in the heart of hurricane country, and am admittedly a bit of a belt-and-suspenders kind of guy (see NPM11: Living The Prepared Life).

There are some post-disaster aftershocks, however, that even two weeks of supplies won’t prepare you for.

The recent earthquakes in Haiti and in Fukushima, Japan – along with  Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans – have shown how communities can be forever changed by a disaster.

With our short attention span, and the news media’s proclivity for moving on to the next big disaster or story, we often forget that the struggle to rebuild devastated communities can take years.

And sometimes, for some of the people caught in harm’s way, there is no going back to the way things used to be.

Today, in a sobering news story by ABC (Australian Brocasting Corp), we learn that the first of what may eventually become 5,000 homes are to be demolished in the wake of their recent series of earthquakes near Christchurch, NZ.

The land they were built on experienced significant liquefaction during the September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes, and so homes will not be rebuilt on these lots.

NZ begins demolishing Christchurch suburbs

By New Zealand correspondent Dominique Schwartz

Updated January 30, 2012 18:50:35

As this story indicates, that despite some compensation offered by the government, many residents have lost tens (or even hundreds) of thousands of dollars and say they have `no way of moving forward’.

With tremors continuing (see map above), those who escaped with only minor or moderate damage get nerve-wracking daily reminders that the ground beneath their feet could move violently again at any time.

And for those who would like to move away and start anew, the reality is that there are few buyers willing to purchase a home or a business in an area where the ground continues to shake.

Not all of the aftershocks of a disaster are seismic in nature. Some are economic, while others can be psychological.

While often hidden from view, the psychological impact of a disaster can be enormous and ongoing. Last year in Post Disaster Stress & Suicide Rates we looked at the impact of disaster-related PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder).

Although a good disaster plan and emergency kit are imperative to get you through the opening hours and days of a disaster, knowing how to help friends, family, and neighbors deal with the psychological effects of a disaster can be equally important.

Luckily, there are things that can be done - even by the layperson - to help reduce the psychological impact of a disaster. 

A few resources you may wish to revisit:

In Psychological First Aid: The WHO Guide For Field Workers we looked a simple guidebook anyone can use to help others in emotional distress.

The CDC also provides a website which contains a number of resources devoted to coping with disasters.

Coping With a Disaster or Traumatic Event

Trauma and Disaster Mental Health Resources

The effects of a disaster, terrorist attack, or other public health emergency can be long-lasting, and the resulting trauma can reverberate even with those not directly affected by the disaster. This page provides general strategies for promoting mental health and resilience. These strategies were developed by various organizations based on experiences in prior disasters.

As does the National Center For PTSD - including videos - on how to provide Psychological First Aid.

Psychological First Aid: Field Operations Guide

For Disaster Responders

Developed jointly with the National Child Traumatic Stress Network, PFA is an evidence-informed modular approach for assisting people in the immediate aftermath of disaster and terrorism: to reduce initial distress, and to foster short and long-term adaptive functioning.

A small reminder that not all wounds are readily visible to the naked eye, and that the proper bandage for them may not always reside inside your first aid kit.

Mike Coston at Avian Flu Diary has an excellent post today: Surviving A Different Kind Of Aftershock. Excerpt (but read the whole thing):

The recent earthquakes in Haiti and in Fukushima, Japan – along with  Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans – have shown how communities can be forever changed by a disaster.   

With our short attention span, and the news media’s proclivity for moving on to the next big disaster or story, we often forget that the struggle to rebuild devastated communities can take years.   

And sometimes, for some of the people caught in harm’s way, there is no going back to the way things used to be.